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ABSTRACT: The initial question related to this article is: 
how has art been assimilating the logical procedures of 
computational algorithms? Our hypothesis is that we are 
being trained by logical procedures that conform, inform, 
and form our thought, such as simulations, models, patterns, 
codes and set of codes, algorithms, devices, interfaces, and 
these are the core of what we call «Conformed Thought» 
(Laurentiz 2015, 2017, 2018 and 2019). It is important 
to highlight that saying a thought is «conformed» is not 
restricted to shapes, physical aspects, expressions of 
patterns, but is a set of socially defined and common habits 
or customs, determined by society, community, or group. 
Therefore, conformed thought causes significant changes 
and drive our thinking, language and, consequently, our 
behavior. The aim is to understand how the logic of the 
algorithms, especially of artificial intelligence, which are 
present in the conceptual and perceptual models of current 
works of art, can generate aesthetic dismemberment. 
The assumption is that an understanding of technological 
procedures increases the creative possibilities and 
expressive potential for art projects. This will be reflected 
in some way in the aesthetic experience, because, changing 
concepts and techniques, thinking and forms of action also 
change and, consequently, creative processes and aesthetic 
results. This is the result of a study that seeks to understand 
how these procedures affect sensory and cognitive systems, 
how our minds process this information and consequently 
how we interact in the world. Our point of view is that 
the artists have the critical role of not only applying these 
logical principles in their artworks, but also intervening in 
these processes in an unconforming way.
KEYWORDS: art, signs, algorithmic, Artificial Intelligence (AI), 
language. 
RESUMEN: La pregunta inicial relacionada con este artículo es: 
¿cómo el arte ha ido asimilando los procedimientos lógicos de los 
algoritmos computacionales? Nuestra hipótesis es que estamos 
siendo entrenados por procedimientos lógicos que conforman, in-
forman y forman nuestro pensamiento, tales como simulaciones, 
modelos, patrones, códigos y conjuntos de códigos, algoritmos, 
dispositivos, interfaces, y estos son el núcleo de lo que llamamos 
de «pensamiento conformado» (Laurentiz 2015, 2017, 2018 y 
2019). Es importante resaltar que al decir que un pensamiento 
está conformado no se limita a formas, aspectos físicos, expre-
siones de patrones, sino que es un conjunto de hábitos o costum-
bres comunes y socialmente definidos, determinados por la socie-
dad, comunidad o grupo. Por lo tanto, el pensamiento conformado 
provoca cambios significativos e impulsa nuestro pensamiento, 
lenguaje y, en consecuencia, nuestro comportamiento. El objetivo 
es comprender cómo la lógica de los algoritmos, especialmente 
de la inteligencia artificial, que están presentes en los modelos 
conceptuales y perceptuales de las obras de arte actuales, puede 
generar un desmembramiento estético. La premisa es que la com-
prensión de los procedimientos tecnológicos aumenta las posibil-
idades creativas y el potencial expresivo de los proyectos de arte. 
Esto se verá reflejado de alguna manera en la experiencia estética, 
porque, cambiando conceptos y técnicas, también cambian el pen-
samiento y las formas de acción y, en consecuencia, los procesos 
creativos y los resultados estéticos. Este es el resultado de un es-
tudio que busca comprender cómo estos procedimientos afectan 
los sistemas sensoriales y cognitivos, cómo nuestra mente procesa 
esta información y consecuentemente interactuamos en el mun-
do. Nuestro punto de vista es que los artistas tienen el papel crítico 
no solo de aplicar estos principios lógicos en sus obras de arte, sino 
también de intervenir en estos procesos de manera disconforme.
PALABRAS CLAVE: arte, signos, algorítmica, Inteligencia 
Artificial (IA), lenguaje.
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INTRODUCTION
The artist Neil Harbisson was born with a rare visual 
syndrome named achromatopsia, that allows him to 
see only in shades of gray. Since 2004, he has a device 
called eyeborg implanted in his head that allows him 
to hear colors. This device works as a receiver with a 
camera attached at its extremity and it analyzes video 
flows and converts their colors into sounds. These 
sounds are transmitted from a chip behind his ear 
directly into his inner ear. In the beginning, he says 
to have almost gone mad from the deluge of sounds, 
but currently he claims to be able to distinguish colors, 
and comments on how this has changed his behavior 
and actions in the world (Harbisson, 2012). To provoke 
changes in one’s own habits and behaviors, as radically 
as this artist does, is brave and surprising.
Surprising for several reasons. Firstly, by showing how 
our minds process information, and consequently, how, 
from this information, we interact with the world. We 
can assume, based on this case, that there is something 
outside (of ourselves) and the way that something 
impresses our senses (natural and artificial) generates 
an idea, sensation or feeling, and we then create a link 
between this something from the external world and 
what was formed internally. Evidently, we are also part of 
what we call external world, and, for that reason, we feed 
our formed ideas-sensations-feelings back into the entire 
system. Also, this established connection must remain 
logically equivalent, which means that there is a sort of 
conditional matching. Being conditioned means having a 
restriction based on criteria that can be of different types: 
they can be due to similitude, similarity, contiguity, or even 
a habit, a rule, law, or arbitrary convention. This has been 
widely studied in sign theories. But this is not the only key 
for our perceptual results to be functional and to allow 
interaction with the world efficiently. The brain also seeks 
to correct any inaccuracies in our senses, and two of its 
main strategies are «[…] to combine redundant sensory 
estimates and to use prior knowledge. There is behavioral 
evidence that the human nervous system employs both 
of these strategies to reduce the adverse effects of noise 
and thus to improve perceptual estimates»  (Ernst and Di 
Luca, 2011: 224).
The fact is that, in Harbisson’s mind, a connection 
has been created between the sound and the color of 
something external, this color having been captured, 
analyzed, and translated by devices, and this relation-
ship becomes a syntactic instruction for the conceptu-
al system to function and allows it new meanings and 
forms of interaction with the world. We say syntactic 
instruction because, even though it is something to be 
put in the place of something else, without being the 
represented thing, it also possesses qualities such as 
frequency, tone, height, duration, rhythm etc., which 
were associated with other models of representation 
(sound in particular), and these apparent aspects also 
gain a dimension of significance in themselves.
Secondly, we have the fact that, after some time, 
Harbisson recognized that the device had become a part 
of his body, like an extension of his senses. He reports it 
took much learning to be able to process sounds and its 
respective colors effortlessly, almost automatically and 
immediately. This learning took place through intense 
repetition, routine, and practice. In other words, the 
relationship between sound and color was learned. 
Furthermore, he was able to broaden his senses even 
more by adding infrared information to the color 
spectrum that was translated to sound, allowing him to 
hear colors that the human eye can’t perceive.
Thirdly, in this case we can assume there is a sensory 
substitution, in which visual data are supplemented by 
a different channel: hearing; we also have a sensory en-
hancement, for there was a sensory addition from the 
infrared data in the transmission (Eagleman, 2020: 91).
What we can already consider is that: 1. both the 
sensory and cognitive systems are used upon the cre-
ation of relationships between internal and external 
processes; 2. the brain adjusts to new demands, and 
this can happen through learning; 3. there is a feedback 
between internal and external systems, and it corrects 
our senses’ imprecisions, through the combination of 
redundant sensory estimates and previous knowledge; 
4. from the moment we impose new conditions and ex-
periences, the brain will conform to them.
 We are interested in investigating different forms 
of representation (see the Research Group Realidades 
at http://www2.eca.usp.br/realidades/en), and these 
are important contributions to discuss language, tech-
nology, thought and art. In this article, we will consid-
er Art an instrument that broadens and questions an 
aesthetic potential. The artist is the one who explores 
this field of possibilities. It is intended to demonstrate 
through art how collaborative processes between 
mind and algorithms can result in creative actions, and 
that the artist has an important critical role to play.
1. NEUROPLASTICITY AND INTEGRATION OF SENSES
Though this is a speculative study, there is much ev-
idence that has already been scientifically proven, and 
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the processes of perception and cognition have been 
the object of many scientific studies. We shall present 
assumptions from the cognitive sciences that support 
some of our proposals.
Bryan Kolb, in his book about the plasticity of the 
brain and behavior, highlights an important issue. He 
writes that: 
«[the human brain] has a capacity for continuous-
ly changing its structure, and ultimately its function, 
throughout a lifetime. This capacity to change, which 
is known as brain plasticity, allows the brain to re-
spond to environmental changes or changes within 
the organism itself» (Kolb, 1995, position 204).
That does not mean that everything must be infinitely 
relearned lest it become lost. On the contrary, the brain 
also has the capacity to preserve changes, as Kolb re-
ports, using a case study about a woman named only 
Donna who, even after a ten-year break, had retained 
great part of her ability to dance, without practicing. This 
preserved ability allowed her to quickly relearn what she 
had learned in the past (Kolb, 1995, position 211).
Research shows that the brain is always in activity 
and should some of its functions diminish or stop (as in 
the case of someone who, for some reason, goes blind), 
neighboring territories tend to take control of that re-
gion, which is defined as a characteristic of neural plas-
ticity. Another important book is LiveWires: The Inside 
of the ever-changing Brain, by David Eagleman, that ex-
plains the previously mentioned case of Neil Harbisson 
(Eagleman, 2020: 84), aside from providing a historical 
overview of neuroscience studies and other instigating 
examples that contribute to the subject matter.
Right at the beginning of his book, Eagleman states 
that our brain machinery is not entirely prepro-
grammed, it molds itself as it interacts with the world 
throughout our lifetime. This does not seem that new, 
as can be illustrated with some references from other 
fields: a) John Dewey (educator) has shown that the 
way we think reflects the experience we have had 
(Dewey, 2010); b) the concept of Umwelt, explored by 
Jacob von Uexküll (biologist) since 1909, works from 
the premise that life is an open and coherent system 
where subject and object are defined as interrelat-
ed elements in a larger context (Von Uexküll, 2007); 
1  «[...] the days of being impressed by plastic molding may be past us. Our goal here is to understand how this living system operates, and 
for that I’ll coin a term that better captures the point: “livewired”. As we’ll see, it becomes impossible to think about the brain as divisible 
into layers of hardware and software. Instead, we’ll need the concept of liveware to grasp this dynamic, adaptable, information-seeking 
system» (Eagleman, 2020: 14).
c) Furthermore, an approach to the ideas of individ-
uation and relational transduction of the philosopher 
Gilbert Simondon (2009) would also bring important 
developments for this investigation.
Nonetheless, the innovator in Eagleman is, mainly 
due to the number of registered cases, the pragmatic 
way he arguments, employing scientifically proven case 
studies and occurrences, demonstrated by brain imag-
ing from various techniques; in addition to presenting 
findings in synesthesia and neurotechnological devices 
to try to answer the question, «How can a blind person 
learn to see with her tongue, or a deaf person learn to 
hear with his skin? » (Eagleman, 2020: 4). Despite being 
difficult to verify, he systematically shows that, in gen-
eral terms, the brain is configured with basic building 
blocks and will mold itself with what it absorbs from its 
surroundings. The point here is that the brain 
«[...] soaks up everything from local language to 
broader culture to global politics. It carries forward 
the beliefs and biases of those who raise it. Every 
fond memory it possesses, every lesson it learns, 
every drop of information it drinks —all these fash-
ions its circuits to develop something that was never 
pre-planned, but instead reflects the world around it» 
(Eagleman, 2020: 3, position 95).
This is an important point for us, given we assume 
that our mind molds itself from the representational 
models of each culture, and we are currently over-
whelmed by what we call conformed thoughts, which 
we will see subsequently, and this must be causing 
substantial changes in our way of thinking and acting 
(Laurentiz 2017, 2018, 2019).
Neuroplasticity is the term used by neuroscience for 
this ability of the brain to change from experience and 
retain certain changes. But, as the word plastic is load-
ed with other meanings and temporality, the author 
considers it appropriate to use another term: livewired 
(Eagleman, 2020:14, position 273). Thus, it defines the 
brain as a dynamic, adaptable system in search of inter-
connected and networked information1.
The number of scientific articles on brain plasticity 
is extensive nowadays, but it suffices at this moment 
to highlight this characteristic of self-configuration 
and adaptability, and to say that neural territories can 
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reconnect and assume functions that are missing or 
damaged, and still to understand that what we are, 
and think, is the result of interaction with our sur-
roundings, based on the experiences we have had. 
This also means that brain network processes involve 
more than genetics, and that the brain can change as 
a direct result of experience.
Add to this the fact that, «[…] in the past decade, 
however, several independent lines of research have 
demonstrated cross-modal responses in primary sen-
sory areas […]» and that the results of these surveys 
«support the notion that primary sensory areas have 
a preference for a given modality but can engage in 
meaningful cross-modal processing depending on 
task demand» (Vasconcelos et al., 2011: 15408).
This means that Science has reviewed the idea that 
each primary cortical area would represent a highly 
specialized functional target (one area that would be 
intended for sight, another for smell, hearing, etc.) 
and that primary sensory areas would be dedicated 
exclusively to the processing of a single modality sen-
sory, while multisensory integration would occur only 
in higher-level associative areas. Recent research in-
dicates that the primary sensory areas prefer a domi-
nant modality, but they are also capable of cross-mod-
al processing (Vasconcelos et al., 2011).
Another interesting fact, returning to Eagleman’s 
book, is how the brain needs to practice repeatedly 
to learn an activity, which can be motor or cognitive. 
This practice significantly changes brain configuration, 
so much so that «[…] when medical students study for 
their final exams over the course of three months, the 
gray matter volume in their brains changes so much it 
can be seen on brain scans with the naked eye» (Ea-
gleman, 2020: 143, position 2308).
That leads us to recover the studies of Gestalt 
theory (1935), which discovered already at that time 
that the performance of a task depends on previous 
performances, and the concept of memory traces is 
an attempt to explain this dependency. It stated that 
it was not easy to distinguish an innate process from 
an acquired one, but the interesting point is that «an 
experienced tennis player did not learn to perform a 
small number of specific movements, but to hit the ball 
correctly in the multivariate situations of the game» 
(Koffka, 1975: 516). This means that, in the learning 
process, we create systems of traces of specific types, 
consolidate them and make them increasingly accessible, 
whether in repeated or new situations. Hence, learning 
is defined by traces of memories that are learned, 
consolidated and available, and that modify processes 
and, consequently, behaviors. Gestalt practitioners also 
considered that traces could be transformed through 
interaction with other traces and processes. Therefore, 
surrounding experiences are not only about the 
memorizing of objects or connections between things 
of the world and some internal relationship created 
with these things, but also the exercising of cognitive 
skills, making them accessible to new functions through 
learning processes. Thus, we reiterate, from the point 
of view of neuroscience and psychology, the points 
raised in the introduction of this article, relating to the 
experience of artist Neil Harbisson. We now recognize, 
in addition to those mentioned previously, the brain’s 
capabilities for self-configuration, adaptability and 
multisensory integration.
We have already pointed out in previous articles the 
relationship between sensory experiences and the 
representational aspects of experiences (Laurentiz, 
2017, 2018, 2019), which culminated in what was 
called «Conformed Thought».
Conformed Thought is a sign, although not every sign 
is a conformed thought. To understand this statement, 
we must recognize the different types of signs that 
form the thought. According to Charles Sanders Peirce:
«One very important triad is this: it has been found 
that there are three kinds of signs which are all indis-
pensable in all reasoning; the first is the diagrammat-
ic sign or icon, which exhibits a similarity or analogy 
to the subject of discourse; the second is the index, 
which like a pronoun demonstrative or relative, forces 
the attention to the particular object intended with-
out describing it; the third [or symbol] is the gener-
al name or description which signifies its object by 
means of an association of ideas or habitual connec-
tion between the name and the character signified» 
(Deeley, 1994: Collected Paper 1.369).
Therefore, the Conformed Thought would be in 
the third category of symbols, the one related to the 
habit(s) acquired. Thus, Conformed Thought is cultur-
al and context-dependent, and is related to a technol-
ogy of its time.
2. CONFORMED THOUGHT: PREVIOUS STUDIES
Conformed Thoughts are patterns, codes and set 
of codes, which end up giving rise to new representa-
tional models, always considering this intrinsic condi-
tion of the relationship between experience, sensa-
tions, and cognition (Laurentiz, 2015).
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Among Peirce’s principles, there are different types 
of signs that make up our thoughts, and there is one 
that is a vague composition of sensations, emotions, 
and feelings. This type is governed by our sensory 
system (including our sense of experience and obser-
vation), and it also leads our thoughts towards semi-
otic developments, promoting changes in habits and 
giving rise to new signs. Amidst the tension between 
sensitive and conforming thoughts, there is a fertile 
environment of conflicts, interferences, correspond-
ences, tensions, scenarios, and a mixture of informa-
tion (Laurentiz, 2015).
The Colors and Words Stroop test (developed by 
John Ridley Stroop) can be a didactic example to ex-
plain what we mean. It was developed to evaluate 
the automation of the reading process, in addition 
to assessing selective attention, focus and speed in 
processing information. The task is to name the color 
in which each printed word is written (which in turn 
are words named after colors), where there is a di-
vergence between the written word and the color of 
ink that was used to write the word (the word green 
is written in yellow ink, for example). In general, writ-
ten words strongly interfere with our ability to iden-
tify and name the colors of those words. Thus, the 
interference generated in the processing of divergent 
information (the word itself and the word’s color) by 
the brain creates a conflicting message. Neuroscience 
tries to explain the reasons for this phenomenon, but 
for the moment the important thing is to focus on 
the effort needed to perform this simple task, which 
demonstrates how we are guided by habits (the 
learned words and their meanings), although we are 
not always aware of it. This implies that all abstract 
thinking must create an interference of some kind in 
the way we perceive and act in the world (Laurentiz, 
2015). In this way, the Colors and Words Stroop test 
and the commented case of artist Neil Harbisson help 
us to realize an important point: comparatively, we 
can consider that patterns, codes, and code sets (con-
formed thoughts), especially of computer languages, 
will also be offering a similar experience, where their 
sensitive qualities of updates and interfaces (and even 
those that we do not even notice their presence) act 
on us and cause changes in our behavior2. 
In my article on Video Games and the development 
of cognitive skills, the proposal was to distinguish a me-
chanical-visual cognitive development of videogame 
2  To advance in this subject see Silvia Laurentiz (2017, 2018 and 2019).
players, originating from an initial report by a player 
who said that some games were able to train and im-
prove performance in other games, and who claims to 
have benefited from that (Laurentiz, 2017). In other 
words, we were proposing that it is possible to exer-
cise cognitive skills, which are associated with game-
play, and which are required in most games. This was a 
speculative hypothesis, especially because, as already 
pointed out by Gestalt theorists, it is not simple to dis-
tinguish an innate process from an acquired one, but as 
an initial data it relied on that empirical report.
Gestalt served as a basis at that time, proposing 
that we are able to train skills that may be request-
ed in different situations, and not just those of the 
training itself. Therefore, once we define learning as 
memory traces that were learned, consolidated, and 
made available, we arrived at some propositions at 
that point:
1. Several of the authors (Gong, et al., 2017; Oei and 
Patterson, 2014; Paturel, 2014; Alves and Carvalho, 
2010) cited in that article stated that experienced 
action videogame players: a. require a high level 
of attention and eye-hand coordination; b. have 
greater functional connectivity – in which different 
regions of the human brain work in sync, even 
though they are anatomically separated; and c. 
have a greater volume of gray matter in island sub-
regions of the brain.
2. They argue that action videogames can im-
prove the functional integration of insular 
sub-regions and their respective networks. 
Since the insula has been considered the one 
responsible for human emotions and feelings, 
it being overactivated demonstrates an intrin-
sic relationship between emotional and cogni-
tive processes activated during the experience 
of playing a videogame.
3. Research has also shown that action videogame 
specialists have improved their spatial vision 
resolution, multisensory temporal processing 
skills, hand motor coordination, contrast sen-
sitivity, and oculomotor performance. Conse-
quently, there is also a change in performance 
in terms of response time, selective attention, 
sustained attention, alternate attention, divid-
ed attention, and a certain ability to change the 
focus of attention.
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In the article Conformed Thought: Consolidating 
Traces of Memories, we indicated at that moment 
that there is an important passage when, from the 
image of something, we move on to the mathemat-
ical model of that thing. The modelling process itself 
already contributes to what we were studying. Right 
from the start, we highlighted the distance between 
thing in itself in the world, thing in the world that 
has been objectified (made object), and model of an 
objectified thing. From a different angle, models are 
formed by objects, which in turn are objectified things 
(Laurentiz, 2018).
It is evident that there is a tension between thing in 
itself and object (indeed, as we have said, all abstract 
thinking creates an interference of some kind in the 
way we perceive and act in the world), which sparks 
significant gains and losses through the sign process. 
This tension already establishes a degree of abstrac-
tion. However, the transition from an object to a mod-
el, which is when it becomes what we call Conformed 
Thought, carries a new degree of abstraction, and that 
was what truly set off the research.
It should be made clear that the very definition of 
object is not simple. The concept used at that time 
was that object is thing that was objectified, in which 
objectifying means giving expression, whether to 
an abstract notion, a feeling, an idea, or anything, 
in a way that can be experienced by others. That is, 
it provides conditions for things to be experienced 
and shared. This is important because, as previous-
ly demonstrated, our mind is constantly changing, 
self-configuring, adapting to demands, and in multi-
sensory integration with our surroundings, and our 
premise is that the way in which experience and the 
sharing of information are enabled plays a fundamen-
tal role in this process.
There is currently an important philosophical move-
ment known as Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO), of-
ten associated with the Speculative Realism.  One of 
the founders of this movement is professor Graham 
Harman. However, our research is based on Charles 
Sanders Peirce’s theory, as already aforementioned.
In a possible presentation of Peirce’s realism, Ivo 
Ibri explains that it would not be «[...] um realismo 
que admite, tão somente, a existência das coisas ex-
ternas à nossa interioridade, mas, sim, aquele que 
3  «Namely, we have to distinguish the Immediate Object, which is the Object as the Sign itself represents it, and whose Being is thus de-
pendent upon the Representation of it in the Sign, from the Dynamical Object, which is the Reality which by some means contrives to 
determine the Sign to its Representation» (Deeley, 1994: Collected Paper 4.536).
reconhece a realidade de um tecido de generalidade, 
conatural, em sua idealidade, ao nosso pensamento» 
(Ibri, 2020: 36).
Peirce brings a special relationship with the objects 
that are offered to our perception: the relationship 
between immediate and dynamic object3. 
According to Winfried Nöth, 
«The most important difference in comparison 
with the positivists is that Peirce rejects the Carte-
sian distinctions between sense and reference on 
the one hand and between the sign and the nonse-
miotic world “extraneous” to the sign on the other. 
The object of a sign can be a “real” thing of practical 
experience, a mere sign, a mental representation, an 
abstract notion, or an idea of something purely ima-
ginary. Peirce says nothing about the “reality” of the 
object at all and describes it as something “percepti-
ble, or only imaginable or even unimaginable in one 
sense” (CP 2.230, 1910) and even goes so far as to 
speculate that “perhaps the Object is altogether ficti-
ve” (CP 8.314, 1909)» (Nöth, 2006: 282).
Thus, it is evident to realize that an apple (thing), 
the image of this apple (objectified thing, therefore 
object) and the mathematical model of this apple 
(synthesis of the object), already indicate important 
representational aspects for brain conformation. The 
author who deals with these sign passages very well 
is Vilém Flusser (2002, 2007) and, to him, they are in-
dicative of degrees of abstraction. It is crucial to un-
derstand that all this happens in a context that feeds 
back into the system, and that, consequently, there 
are also processes involved in evaluation, transfor-
mation, comparison with reference values, adapta-
tion, and coding. This is how the cybernetic feedback 
model we are following works (Laurentiz, 2018). Thus, 
if we have already said that, from neuroscience, it is 
clear that the brain uses strategies to correct inaccu-
racies in the information received by our senses and 
that two of them are combining redundant sensory 
data and prior knowledge, at this time, we are add-
ing new skills. That is, in the process of using objects 
with the purpose of sharing with others our acquired 
experiences, we employ several strategies, and with 
them we cause effects (ideas, sensations and feelings) 
and conformed thoughts, which feed back into the 
system –meaning they share with other language sys-
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tems, objects and models in processes of evaluation, 
transformation, comparison of values, etc.–, in a con-
tinuous and circular relationship. We will address this 
point in more detail later.
Let’s return to the main topic after that brief digres-
sion to clarify a few points. According to Gualtiero 
Piccinini and Andrea Scarantino (2011), the notions 
of computing and information processing are often 
confused and end up being associated with a theory 
of cognition. The authors warn about the differenc-
es between them, making it clear that the notion of 
information is related to communication systems and 
bears issues of signs; and that information processing 
through computation can only be analogously com-
pared to a cognitive system. In this article, information 
processing must be carried out by means of compu-
tation in the generic sense (Piccinini and Scarantino, 
2011: 26). 
It should be clear that we are not considering in-
formation processed at the machine level, where 
each memory cell finds two states, 0 and 1, nor are 
we talking about sequences of bytes or bits, as they 
do not carry semantic content. We are considering 
Information as a collection or set of organized data 
and knowledge, including software, systems, and the 
programming itself that will be carrying out logical 
procedures, manipulation, and production of images, 
and may even generate information to some semantic 
degree in a mathematical and probabilistic way.
Furthermore, using digital-analog and analog-digi-
tal converters, the system will carry natural and non-
natural information, preserving some causal relation-
ship between them. Thus, generically, computation 
and cognition can be compared, but the authors warn 
that it is not so simple: 
«[…] Many neuroscientists and computer scientists 
use “information” to mean nonnatural information, 
while many philosophers use “information” to mean 
natural information. Making progress in our unders-
tanding of cognition requires clarity and precision on 
what kind of computation and information processing 
are involved in cognition and on whether the two are 
related» (Piccinini and Scarantino, 2011: 32).
Surely, these are legitimate questions but will not 
be discussed in this article. Anyway, the concept of in-
formation has been used in different ways, depending 
on the context in which it is inserted and under which 
a specific phenomenon is related. In this article, infor-
mation is what will be transmitted by the sign, which 
means that it is part of a chain of significant actions, 
led by interpretants, which Peirce called semiosis.
Depending on the nature of the sign, as already ex-
plained, it will transmit certain information, which will 
also depend on the context and knowledge of its in-
terpreter. Interestingly, as Peirce is not anthropocen-
tric, «each increase of a man’s information is at the 
same time the increase of a word’s information and 
vice versa. So that there is no difference even here» 
(Deeley, 1994: Collected Paper 7.587).
Back to the matter, in the article Conformed Thought 
and the Art of Algorithms, we discussed logical proce-
dures in conceptual and perceptual models, in a case 
study of works belonging to a relationship between 
art, science and technology (Laurentiz, 2019).  Our in-
terest was to reflect on specific contributions of codes 
and set of codes, algorithms, and patterns, as result-
ing of concepts, texts, and scientific theories and, 
therefore, as updated forms of elaborated knowledge 
(conformed thought). It was a study aimed at under-
standing how these logical procedures shape think-
ing, and how they feed into the systems –sensory and 
cognitive– that evolutionarily and through circularity 
generate increasingly complex sign systems. We were, 
at that time, focused on the different logical processes 
of algorithms because, considering the improvement 
in the development of algorithms in the last decades, 
it is remarkable how we can perceive changes in the 
approaches and processes used by the artists.
Among the different logical processes involved in the 
algorithms discussed, we mention pseudo-random, 
stochastic, cybernetic, emergence, generative process-
es, and lastly, processes of artificial intelligence and 
learning. We also present the differences between a 
classic algorithm and a machine learning one.
It is only necessary to consider that, while classic 
algorithms produce an output based on the steps de-
scribed in the sequence of instructions of the algo-
rithm, similarly to a cake recipe, in the machine learn-
ing algorithm, a mathematical model is built that maps 
inputs to specific outputs, and then feeds the model 
with pairs of input + expected output to train it –and 
it will adjust its internal parameters from this training.
That is, there is a difference in procedures and results, 
which in some way means that the algorithm itself goes 
through a process of modeling and adjustments deter-
mined by what it learned during its training stage. With 
the training completed, the program will be able to be 
used with new data entries –and even be easily adapt-
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ed to new situations. It would be hasty to suggest that 
it would thus be consolidating memory traces, but we 
must recognize that there is a difference between an 
algorithm that solves a problem and one that can come 
to solve different problems.
But at that moment we were interested in recog-
nizing that, in the generation of models and between 
models, simulations and learning, we have different 
strategies involved. Classification technique, for exam-
ple, widely used in Machine Learning, groups things 
that are similar by parameters that satisfy some selec-
tion criteria, norm, or law. Discrimination processes, 
also extensively used, impose restrictions based on 
certain conditions and circumstances. Therefore, we 
not only have synthesis of objects transformed into 
models, but we also have mathematical models that 
analyze, classify, and select models, which are formed 
by objects, which are objectified things. Indeed, there 
are classic internal algorithms within the Machine 
Learning algorithm, encapsulated algorithms, net-
works containing several coupled algorithms. This 
increases the complexity of these logical procedures 
and, in turn, the levels of representational abstrac-
tion. These new procedures should cause a new ten-
sion between sensations and conformed thinking, in 
an environment of blends of information and levels 
of abstractions.
3. ART AND LOGICAL PROCEDURES OF THE ALGO-
RITHMS
Initially, we must understand that the digital image 
production processes are different from analog pro-
cesses. It is, substantially, a formal procedure, that 
stores elements described in the form of data, and uses 
abstract rules in its construction, restricting its state 
space, or field of possibilities, to what can be mathe-
matically well defined. However, despite their formal 
logical-abstract features, they carry plasticity-sensitive 
marks –by updating themselves formally. Evidently, 
for mathematical expressions to be viewed as images, 
it will take more than simple translation of numerical 
data into the projected light information. As Arlindo 
Machado would say, «[...] é preciso, antes de mais 
nada, posicionar-se em relação a certos ditames da 
representação plástica acumulados ao longo dos sécu-
los, tal como nos foram legados pela tradição da pin-
tura, da fotografia e do cinema» (Machado, 1993: 60). 
4  There are many distinctions between apparatus and device that would be interesting to explore, but for this article both will be considered 
as producers of thoughts conformed at some level.
This is an important issue because, for the most part, 
we are just forging procedures so that the image gains 
characteristics of representations which already have 
some sort of consented ideological domination. This 
means that the algorithm will simulate a model of per-
spective projection, and «[…] esse modelo depende ba-
sicamente da maneira como imaginamos a intervenção 
do observador na enunciação da imagem, como por ex-
emplo: os modelos de perspectiva paralela e a clássica» 
(Machado, 1993: 65). This is important because we will 
see later some examples of works that seek to simulate 
representational models, and it depends on us to real-
ize that, even when viewing a digital image, we resort 
to earlier projective techniques.
Furthermore, returning to the ideas of Vilém Flusser, 
when we talk about images produced by apparatus4, 
we already refer to processes of abstraction through 
two capacities: imagination and conceptualization. 
Imagination is the ability to encode four-dimensional 
phenomena into flat symbols and to decode the infor-
mation thus encoded. In a general sense, imagination 
is the ability to make and decipher images. Conceptu-
alization, on the other hand, is the ability that allows 
the encoding and deciphering of texts (Flusser, 2002: 
10).
Hence, a traditional image, for Flusser, is a first-de-
gree abstraction because it abstracts two dimen-
sions from the concrete phenomenon that has four 
dimensions. In contrast, the technical image, the 
one produced by an apparatus, is a third-degree ab-
straction, since apparatus are applied scientific texts 
(second-degree abstraction) and, therefore, concepts. 
Consequently, the process of abstraction of the tech-
nical image uses both capacities of abstraction, name-
ly, imagination and conceptualization.
Yet there is still, as recognized by Flusser, the emer-
gence of «a new imagination» where «[...] somente 
uma Imaginação totalmente calculada pode ser con-
siderada explicada», with a character of simulation, 
«[...] como se a imaginação tivesse se autonomizado» 
(Flusser, 2007: 169, 162, 173).
It is still called imagination by the author because 
it creates and deciphers images, but it is a different 
type of image. The images of the new imagination 




ARBOR Vol. 197-800, abril-junio 2021, a603 | ISSN-L: 0210-1963
9
https://doi.org/10.3989/arbor.2021.800005
The intention of a synthesized image may be similar 
to that of other conventional images, one may want 
to imitate a circumstance or object, but then the new 
imagination will have been put at the service of the 
old (Flusser, 2007: 174). Recalling Machado (1993), 
the digital image visualization process itself already 
simulates representational models from previous pro-
cesses. We currently have numerous works using AI 
for image production that demonstrate that this issue 
is quite complex. We will see below examples of im-
ages generated by an AI algorithm that acts as a style 
generator. Would they be putting the new imagina-
tion at the service of a first-degree imagination that of 
traditional images, in this case?
The important thing to note for now is that even if 
you want to imitate/simulate objects that are things 
of the world from the construction of models, they 
may be logically equivalent to the simulated object 
–but not the same. For a closer look, this distinction 
is important.
Thus, something (with four dimensions) is abstract-
ed into image of this thing (representation with two 
dimensions through the capacity of imagination), 
which is abstracted into a concept of the image of 
the thing (one dimension, linear or discursive writing 
through the capacity for conceptualization), which is 
then abstracted into the image of the concept of the 
image of the thing (product of apparatus, which in 
turn are applied scientific texts that are reconstructed 
on a two-dimensional surface), which is then abstract-
ed into synthetic image by simulation/modeling of the 
object (generation of a model of an objectified thing, 
or mathematical model of procedures, by dimension-
less synthesis), by a new capacity for imagination. In 
each of these processes there will be gains and losses, 
which will result in new experiences (exchanges, shar-
ing, interaction, feedback, and so on) and demands, 
which will con/in/form our brain, and which, conse-
quently, will change our behavior and actions in the 
world. Ultimately, we act in the world like Neil Harbis-
son, perhaps not so radically, but it is important to be 
aware of that.
4. CASE ANALYSIS
How does art contribute to this issue? We have al-
ready said that we will consider Art as that knowledge 
that expands and questions an aesthetic potential, 
5  Cooperative work between ING, Microsoft, Delft University of Technology, and two museums: the Mauritshuis and the House of 
Rembrandt. Available in https://www.nextrembrandt.com/
and that the artist is the one who explores this field 
of possibilities. In this sense, we will present works 
that we consider bringing an expansion of aesthetic 
issues related to conformed thinking, since they use 
AI algorithms (autonomous imagination) in their de-
velopment. However, of course, these types of works 
are not limited to what we will present next, which 
will only serve for our final considerations on how 
conceptual and perceptual models of current works 
of art generate aesthetic dismemberments.
Let us return to the case of an image generated by 
an AI style transfer program, which seeks to simulate 
a representational model based on the analysis of a 
database of numerous images of a specific style. We 
have already cast doubt on whether an autonomous 
imagination of this type would be at the service of a 
first-degree imagination, that of traditional images. 
This question is appropriate because, in a way, the 
resulting images recover «[…] certos ditames da rep-
resentação plástica acumulados ao longo dos séculos 
[...]» (Machado, 1993: 60), to extract a profile that will 
be used as a model for new images. As in any comput-
er calculation product, the result of such a process, 
in the search for transferring a style from an image 
database, there is the extraction of a statistical rela-
tionship of some kind and, therefore, a mathematical 
calculation.
We can cite several works that follow this reasoning.
We are not questioning the artistic merit of these 
productions, only stressing the importance of re-
alizing that what is admirable in these works is the 
mathematical calculation capable of generating such 
a complex model, produced by other models of image 
production. In addition, they are conformed thoughts, 
governed by an autonomous imagination, with a char-
acter of image simulation, and with dimensionless 
abstraction (Flusser, 2007). Another relevant factor 
is the amount of data used, that in other processes 
would not be configurable, and that now generate 
statistical models (like an analytical intelligence way).
As Ron Augustus explains, in the project The Next 
Rembrandt5, developed by Microsoft:
«We examined the entire collection of Rembrandt’s 
work, studying the contents of his paintings pixel by 
pixel. To get this data, we analyzed a broad range of 
materials like high resolution 3D scans and digital fi-
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les, which were upscaled by deep learning algorithms 
to maximize resolution and quality. This extensive da-
tabase was then used as the foundation for creating 
The Next Rembrandt» (Augustus, 2016).
Therefore, although an image has been created by 
placing the new imagination at the service of the old 
(Flusser, 2007), and the visualization process simu-
lates representational models from previous process-
es (Machado, 1993), it can be seen that the aesthetic 
issue is in the conceptual model generated, more than 
in the plastic result achieved:
«[...] há alguns anos atrás, um matemático estudou 
a pintura de Pollock e descobriu que a pintura dele é 
fractal. [...] Isto significa que o artista, explorando o 
umwelt dele, no caso o Pollock, tropeçou num traço 
da realidade sim, que era o fractal. Num traço de rea-
lidade que não era nem conhecido direito pelo pes-
soal da ciência. Ele, como artista, sentiu isto e viu isto. 
Detalhes quanto a percepção humana sofisticados 
você encontra nas pinturas de Van Gogh também»  
(Albuquerque Vieira, 2010: 21).
Jorge Albuquerque Vieira believes that the artist, 
exploring fields of possibility in his/her surroundings, 
«[…] tangencia a realidade e percebe coisas que mui-
tas vezes nem um cientista percebe» (Albuquerque 
Vieira, 2010: 22).
We can mention another work that explores this 
process as well in 2018. The collections La Famille De 
Belamy produced by the Parisian collective Obvious-
art, has generated many discussions, especially due to 
the high value that it was commercialized for. Questions 
about the art market do not engage us at this point. 
What matters in this article are the logical procedures 
involved. Currently, neural network architectures 
are composed of more than one network, which are 
already quite complex by themselves. Each one is 
placed as if they were competitors and opponents 
of each other. The two competing neural networks 
(GANs) used were called Generator and Discriminator. 
The first, as the name suggests, creates an image from 
information fed by a database. The authors used a 
database of over 10,000 portraits painted between 
the 14th and 20th centuries. The Discriminator tries 
to find differences between images made by human 
beings and those made by the Generator. The idea is 
for the Generator to deceive the Discriminator, so that 
the latter considers that the image has been produced 
by a human and, therefore, would not be synthetic 
but original, which would lead it to be selected. In 
this process, the system could learn to distinguish 
more and more quickly what would be a synthetic 
image from one produced by human beings. Explicitly, 
we have a case of an autonomous, dimensionless 
imagination passing for a first-degree imagination. 
Again, the biggest contribution in this case, in our 
view, is the developed mathematical model that is 
capable of simulating a representational model of 
the first-degree abstraction process, and this passage 
in some way leads us to perceive something that we 
had not noticed before in those particular aesthetic 
models in a formal analysis of works.
The next piece is completely different. The video 
work entitled What I saw before the darkness, by an 
artist who simply calls herself the girl who speaks with 
AI, was created by artificial intelligence algorithms as 
well. Initially, a hyper-realistic image of a human face 
was generated. The program creates a face, a syn-
thetic image generated by algorithms through an au-
tonomized Imagination, as the face created does not 
exist in real life. Instead, it was composed by neural 
networks (GANs) that learn not from paintings, as in 
the previous examples, but from photos of people’s 
faces, to produce an image from a synthesis model 
extracted from this database. In this case, a machine 
was trained from millions of photographs to produce 
a realistic human face, but that does not represent 
any person who has ever lived.
Then, one by one, the neurons of the artificial mind 
are turned off, while the process is recorded in a 
time-lapse video. It does not matter which and how 
data are erased, but that with each erasure, the face 
is transformed into a completely new image. It is a 
metaphor, in which the network would slowly forget 
how that face looks. As if the artificial neurons were 
turning off one by one, simulating a forgetfulness, un-
til the network effectively forgets the appearance of 
that face and stops recognizing a face in the resulting 
image.
We have several important issues with this work, 
but we will highlight only three. Firstly, the idea of a 
photograph of someone who does not and has not ex-
isted is already disturbing. It harkens back to the whole 
history of photography, from the relation of the indi-
ces of reality that a photograph is capable of rescuing; 
yet, despite the recognition of traces of photography, 
there does not exist the thing itself photographed. 
That is, its referential is not a singular referent, but a 
generalized synthesis of innumerable referents. Sec-
ondly, the project creates a metaphor for the func-
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tioning of the brain system based on the use of neural 
networks and AI algorithms. The network creates an 
image with a face from countless images; there is the 
recognition of what a face is, the identification of the 
elements that make up a face, the discrimination of a 
face, and comparison between countless faces, until 
the moment when the information loses its reference 
values and criteria necessary to identify one face. But 
what the network is unable to perceive is that when 
we watch the process recorded on video, we start to 
see in those images’ other forms: a disfigured face, 
a skull, the representation of death, and we start to 
create other senses and meanings. In other words, 
what is surprising to us the system cannot perceive, 
losing this aesthetic potential. Thus, the system may 
even metaphorically represent some cognitive abili-
ties, but it is not able to admire its aesthetic potential. 
Thirdly, it creates a provocation about the role of for-
getfulness in our lives. Recalling Funes o Memorioso, 
by Jorge Luis Borges, forgetting has an important role 
for thought. «To think is to forget a difference, to gen-
eralize, to abstract» (Borges, 1979). And Milan Kun-
dera would say that in the face of life, «the old dead 
[should] make room for the young dead» (Kundera, 
1985). What is distressing is the paradox of proposing 
for a computer to forget data.
As a last example we will mention the artist 
Sougwen Chung. The artist defines her work as 
human-robotic design performances, in full collective 
collaboration, exploring a work that emerges from 
human and non-human relationships. She creates 
performances with one or more robotic arms, which 
respond to a variety of data inputs that she has been 
developing for some time. As explained by the artist, 
in the beginning she used a gesture-based approach, 
using a neural network. The drawing of the line that 
the artist made manually was recorded in real time, 
either by an aerial camera or by a sensor at the tip of 
the paintbrush, which transformed her positional data 
into something that could be read by the system. The 
system articulated by the robotic units produced a set 
of positions based on an interpretation of the artist’s 
own drawing archives over the last twenty years. It is 
a process that builds a feedback cycle of the artist’s 
own drawing style with the drawings that are being 
made in the act of performance, between the artist 
and the robotic arm, as if it were a graphic dance done 
by both. The artist recently integrated other data into 
the system, such as her biometrics, with data on her 
heart rate and brain waves. The artist idea is to «think 
about ways in which humans connect to mechanical 
and artificial systems and vice versa and ways that 
can function as a creative catalyst». Again, several 
important issues emerge from this work, we will only 
highlight some.
First is the very definition of drawing made from the 
artist’s gesture, and its replication by the robotic arm. 
The idea that the drawing of the artist’s stroke can be 
recovered by devices (be cameras or sensors) and that 
this data would define her drawing seems initially lim-
ited, but it expands the possibilities of interaction be-
tween the drawing from the artist’s gesture and body 
and the program with the interface of the robotic 
arm. It is natural that passing these data through de-
vices is a third-degree abstraction, which means that 
there are significant gains and losses, considering the 
already mentioned ideas of Flusser (2007). But the 
most relevant thing at this moment is how the artist 
says she ended up adapting to the machine’s inaccu-
racies, readjusting her own gestures, and, converse-
ly, how the AI ended up generating a computational 
model from countless drawings by the artist, while 
adapting to the robot’s movements, in continuous 
circularity. The feedback process between them is 
clearly seen, and it is described in the project by the 
collaborative involvement of the creative action. This 
involvement defined as a creative catalyst causes sig-
nificant changes, both sensory and cognitive, in the 
aesthetic experience.
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
Needless to say, the artworks presented here do not 
end the proposed subject, but they suffice for our fi-
nal considerations.
We have already demonstrated in the items In-
troduction; 1. Neuroplasticity and integration of the 
senses; and 2. Conformed Thought: previous studies, 
that:
1. In the processes of perception and representa-
tion, both the sensory and cognitive systems are 
used. 2. The brain adjusts to new demands, and 
this can happen due to its surrounding world and/
or through training in learning processes. 3. Conse-
quently, there is a feedback between internal and 
external systems, and this corrects inaccuracies in 
our senses, initially combining redundant sensory 
estimates and prior knowledge, but we have seen, 
from neuroscience and psychology, that self-config-
uration, adaptability and multisensory integration 
are also aligned. 4. As soon as we impose new con-
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ditions and experiences, the brain will conform to 
them. 5. It is possible to exercise cognitive skills, and 
improvements can already be seen from the practice 
of videogames, such as spatial resolution of vision, 
multisensory temporal processing skills, hand motor 
coordination, contrast sensitivity, oculomotor per-
formance, etc. 6. And finally, since the production of 
images from different processes generates aesthet-
ic, sensory and cognitive consequences, the logical 
processes involved in the algorithms add new ques-
tions. The techniques of classification, selection, 
comparison, and discrimination in the passage from 
an image of a thing to the model of this thing must 
be taken into account by aesthetic proposers. Thus, 
new degrees of abstraction, both of imagination and 
conceptualization, are required and applied in a sign 
feedback system. From another point of view, it is 
important to realize that «an episteme of causation 
is replaced by one of automated correlations» and 
«[…] which often does take the shape of a statistical 
hallucination» (Pasquinelli and Joler, 2020: 2).
It remains to ponder how art contributes, expands, 
and questions this aesthetic potential through the use 
of conformed thoughts. From the examples of works 
presented, we must consider the following.
Artists, exploring fields of possibilities of their sur-
roundings, end up perceiving sophisticated articula-
tions of reality that follow criteria of organization and 
coherence which, according to Albuquerque Vieira 
(2010), are associated with a root of aesthetics. In this 
case, since in our current times we are persistently 
faced with what are called Conformed Thoughts, these 
must be somehow altering and reconfiguring our brain 
plasticity. In this period of 2019-2021, we are living in 
a spectacularly propitious moment for new behaviors 
and habits, imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic. At this 
moment, our interactions and experiences have been 
restricted almost exclusively to interfaces, screens, pro-
jections, technical images, which are themselves con-
formed thoughts, results of concepts, models of knowl-
edge of a culture or group; therefore, they reorganize 
actions determined by habits, attitudes, behaviors, and 
cultural practices. If, as previously mentioned, under-
graduates who study extensively for three months al-
ready show signs of brain changes, there is no way to 
disregard that these months in which we were forced 
to such drastic change in habits and behaviors have al-
tered us in any way.
Specifically, when we use image recognition sys-
tems, for example, we must remember that these 
are being fed by information from identifiers, classes, 
genders, in some cases economic status with defined 
socio-cultural condition, etc. The point is that neural 
networks cannot invent their own classes, classifiers, 
and constraints, and this conditions them to the rec-
ognition of the patterns in which these networks were 
trained. In other words, their training sets reveal the 
historical, geographical, racial, and socioeconomic po-
sitions of their trainers. So, as we are living in these 
last months according to algorithms that act in this 
way, we are being conformed to think and act in the 
way these systems were programmed. The mind itself, 
eager for information and curious to learn, starts act-
ing like a learning AI network, despite the fact that the 
opposite is always announced, that Machine Learning 
networks learn from us. Breaking with this inversion 
is an enormous challenge. In addition to this paradox, 
we must realize the scope this can reach, for example, 
through social networks. 
There are many examples of social networks that 
use systems that can identify people, places, objects, 
places, gestures, faces, sexes, economic status, and 
relationships. Artists are attentive and denounce 
these image conditioners. We must be aware that 
AI systems assume human visual culture and trans-
form it into a massive and flexible training set and 
the greater the use of these systems, the more they 
will influence, condition, and shape our actions in the 
world. «It is time to realize that it is not the statistical 
model that constructs the subject, but rather the sub-
ject that structures the statistical model» (Pasquinelli 
and Joler, 2020: 17).
We have also presented different approaches and 
uses for artificial intelligence algorithms in artistic 
works. As we have already stated, some algorithms are 
able to find statistical patterns in large amounts of data 
and generate images that simulate representation-
al models of different processes. From the examples 
shown, we can see that the nonconformed artist is not 
limited to applying formulas, operations, calculations, 
functions, and models. Their commitment is different. 
The artist can intercede in the process itself, subverting 
the very function of modeling and the algorithm, de-
nouncing this conformed way of producing images. The 
artist can also train a machine and make it lose what 
it learned on purpose, triggering the human capacity 
in which remembering and forgetting are accomplices 
and not adversaries in the thought process. The artist 
can create a system that feeds back into human and 
non-human action, in a process capable of initiating 
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adjustments, improvisations, mishaps, accidents, stim-
uli during their performances - and this strategy is an 
important escape valve for the pitfalls of conformed 
thought. The aesthetic result of all these procedures 
will then be relearned, reevaluated, and will reconfig-
ure experiences through circularity and systemic feed-
back. And, just as the mind has human strategies and 
capabilities, there are non-human abilities that compu-
tational algorithms have, and both mind and algorithm 
bring them into this relationship for an involvement of 
creative action, as we intended to demonstrate.
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